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Terrorists and Special Status: The British
Experience in Northern Ireland
By JAY M. SPILLANE
Member of the Class of 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
Northern Ireland has been in a state of civil unrest and emergency
rule for nearly twenty years.' This tiny state, part of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has been shaken by sectar-
ian strife between bitterly opposed Catholic and Protestant
communities,2 and the re-emergence of the paramilitary Irish Republican
Army (IRA).' Britain has responded to this situation by enacting legis-
1. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
2. Despite the fact that Northern Ireland is split along sectarian lines, its troubles are not
fundamentally religious in nature. Rather, the conflict has deep political, historical, and cul-
tural roots. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. Authors often use the term "Repub-
lican" and "Loyalist" to denote Northern Ireland's political division. In this context,
"Republicans" are Catholics who favor termination of ties with Britain and unification with
the Republic of Ireland. Protestant "Loyalists" favor continuing ties with Britain and oppose
unification with the heavily Catholic Republic. See generally J. DARBY, CONFLICT IN NORTH-
ERN IRELAND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLARIZED COMMUNITY (1976).
3. The IRA is a clandestine quasi-military or terrorist organization recruited from
Northern Ireland's Catholic community. The term "IRA" is used to refer to a number of
subgroups: the Provisional IRA, the largest group, which engages in violent operations; the
Sinn Fein (Gaelic for "Ourselves Alone"), which is the Provisional IRA's political wing; and
the Official IRA, which called a ceasefire in 1972 and works separately from the Provisional
IRA. See REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVI-
SIONS) ACT 1978, 1984, No. 9222, 11 (Lord Baker, Chairman) [hereinafter Baker Report];
see generally J. BELL, THE SECRET ARMY (1979); T. COOGAN, THE IRA (1970); K. BOYLE,
T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CON-
TROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 16 (1980) [hereinafter TEN YEARS ON]. The IRA is not the
only paramilitary group operating in Northern Ireland, although it is the most notorious. In
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 32 (1978), the European Commission on
Human Rights concluded that the threat and reality of terrorism in Northern Ireland comes
almost exclusively from the IRA. Other paramilitary organizations, such as the Protestant
Ulster Volunteer Force, however, continue to carry on activities there. See The Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, sched. 2 [hereinafter 1978 Act] for a list of "pro-
scribed" or outlawed organizations. For further information regarding Protestant paramili-
tary organizations in Northern Ireland, see generally S. NELSON, ULSTER'S UNCERTAIN
DEFENDERS (1984). This Note focuses on the plight of imprisoned members of the IRA, but
the same legal analysis applies equally to imprisoned members of these other organizations.
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lation that creates extraordinary legal powers in Northern Ireland4 in
derogation of civil liberties guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights5 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 6
Northern Ireland's so-called "emergency acts" have created special
legal procedures aimed at perpetrators of "terrorist" or "scheduled" of-
fenses.7 Since 1972, the legal status of persons jailed under these acts has
changed. From 1972 to 1976, IRA prisoners were deemed political of-
fenders and accorded "special status."8 Beginning in 1976, Britain im-
plemented a criminalization program which downplayed the political
motivation of convicted IRA terrorists and eliminated special status.9
Certain imprisoned IRA members' claims to special status under interna-
tional law have been considered and rejected by the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights. °  Thus, under existing domestic and
4. The two most recent examples of Britain's so-called "emergency" acts are the 1978
Act, supra note 3, and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, ch. 8
[hereinafter 1984 Act].
5. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in 1950 Y.B. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 418 [hereinafter European Convention]. Members of the European Conven-
tion are obligated to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction" the rights guaranteed
therein. Id. art. 1. The United Kingdom ratified the European Convention in 1951. See A.
ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 310 (1977). The European Convention, however,
allows member nations to derogate from many of the guarantees contained therein "in time of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation." European Convention,
supra, art. 15.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2000A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant].
The International Covenant contains a derogation provision nearly identical to that found in
the European Convention. Compare International Covenant, art. 4 with European Covenant,
art. 15. Art. 41 of the International Covenant provides for state complaint procedures to the
UN Human Rights Committee. Art. 41 has come into force relatively recently, however, and
the Committee has produced little authority of interest to this Note. In contrast, the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights have repeatedly handed down decisions relating to
the security situation in Northern Ireland. See Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights
Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4, 23 (1981). For these reasons, this
Note restricts its discussion of international human rights guarantees in Northern Ireland and
derogation therefrom to the European Convention.
7. The provisions of the 1978 and 1984 acts are aimed at those suspected of committing
or preparing to commit a "scheduled offence," which are deemed the type of crimes typically
committed by members of terrorist organizations. See 1978 Act, supra note 3, sched. 4; RE-
PORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. Ser. 5, No. 5185 (Lord Diplock, Chair-
man) [hereinafter Diplock Report].
8. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
10. McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R. 161, 1980 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM.
RT. 256 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
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international law, imprisoned IRA members have no legal claim to spe-
cial status.
United Kingdom law first accepted and then rejected the notion that
the ostensibly political motivation of the terrorists in Northern Ireland
created a separate class of criminals." Both Britain and the international
community, however, have failed to analyze the question of special status
for IRA prisoners from the perspective of the acts of the imprisoning
government. This Note argues that the use of extraordinary state powers
to imprison those suspected of committing terrorist offenses, in deroga-
tion of international human rights guarantees, 2 creates a class of special
status prisoner. 13
This Note first lays a brief historical foundation to aid in under-
standing the current troubles in Northern Ireland. It then considers the
legal status of IRA prisoners under United Kingdom law, and their peti-
tion for recognition of special status before the European Commission.
Finally, this inquiry shifts to a discussion of Britain's assumption of ex-
traordinary state powers as a means of quelling civil unrest. It concludes
with a discussion of Britain's recent re-evaluation of extraordinary pow-




A detailed treatment of the historical roots of the hatred and vio-
lence which grips Northern Ireland is beyond the scope of this Note, 14
11. The current attitude is reflected in the Baker Report: "The acceptance of a criminal
act for a political end must appear to the ordinary citizen to cut across the avowed policy of
criminalisation. Murder is murder." Baker Report, supra note 3, q 439.
12. The requirement that such powers be in derogation of international human rights
guarantees lends objectivity to the analysis which follows. One can only call state police pow-
ers "extraordinary" when measured against certain rights to which the state is bound. Thus,
for example, a similar analysis would apply in other nations signatory to the European Con-
vention or the International Covenant. For other nations which do not adhere to an interna-
tional "Bill of Rights," the following analysis is inapplicable.
13. This Note uses the term "special" rather than "political" status for two reasons.
First, this is the term the British themselves applied to IRA prisoners before embarking on
their criminalization program. Second, it avoids the emotionally loaded term "political pris-
oner," which many might argue should not be applied to perpetrators of violent crimes. Thus,
this Note analyzes only whether the IRA prisoners should legally be accorded special status,
meaning simply a status different from that accorded those who are prosecuted through the
ordinary criminal justice system. It does not concern itself with subjective inquiries into the
moral or political merits of the IRA's cause, or the violent tactics which they have adopted.
14. The troubles in Ireland have been ongoing for centuries, and have spawned a huge
19861
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but a brief summary is appropriate. England first invaded Ireland over
800 years ago, finally conquering it in the 15th century.15 Polarized
along cultural, religious, and political lines, the British and Irish have
often resolved their disputes with bloodshed.16 England solidified its grip
on Catholic Ireland through staunchly Loyalist Protestant emigrants,
who concentrated in the northern province of Ulster.17 Ireland was fi-
nally incorporated into the United Kingdom in 1800 and ruled directly
from London.' 8
War against British rule erupted in Ireland in 1916,19 which con-
tributed to England's decision to grant Irish home rule in 1920.2o
Ulster's Protestants, however, protested vehemently against separation
from London,2 ' forcing Parliament to partition Ireland.22 The Catholic
South became the independent Republic of Ireland; six of Ulster's heav-
ily Protestant counties, retained as part of the United Kingdom, became
volume of literature. The conflict in Northern Ireland in particular has its own substantial
body of literature. Indeed, "the most recent bibliography on the Northern Irish conflict con-
tains more than 3,000 references, almost all published since the eruption of community vio-
lence in the late 1960's." NORTHERN IRELAND: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 7 (J.
Darby ed. 1983) [hereinafter NORTHERN IRELAND BACKGROUND]. Some of the recent works
on Ulster include J. DOWNEY, THEM & Us: BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE NORTHERN QUES-
TION 1969-1982 (1983); P. BUCKLAND, A HISTORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1981); F.
LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, ULSTER (1981); A. STEWART, THE NARROW GROUND, AS-
PECTS OF ULSTER, 1609-1969 (1977); and C. FITZGIBBON, RED HAND: THE ULSTER COLONY
(1972).
15. This invasion was dispatched by King Henry II in 1169. England's conquest of Ire-
land was completed during England's Tudor period. J. DOWNEY, supra note 14, at 21-22.
16. "[N]o two nations were more foreign to each other than the Irish and the English ....
At once contradicting and emphasizing [their] real and apparent similarities, this foreignness,
as well as the intensely close connection of the islands, antedates history .... The political and
cultural differences... have been enormous ever since the Roman conquest of Britain." Id. at
20.
17. See BUCKLAND, supra note 14. The "Plantation of Ulster" began in 1609. By 1703,
less than five percent of Ulster's land remained in the hands of the Catholic Irish. J. DARBY,
supra note 2, at 3.
18. The Union With Ireland Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67, reprinted in 23 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 832 (3d ed. 1970).
19. L. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, supra note 14, ch. 5.
20. Id.
21. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 14, at 20.
22. Ulster Protestants had been staunch opponents of home rule for Ireland during the
civil war era, preferring that the entire island be ruled directly from Westminster as part of the
United Kingdom. Seeing that "the wind was blowing" towards partition and self-government,
they settled instead for a solution which would insure a safe Protestant majority. Three heav-
ily Catholic counties within historical Ulster were left on the Republic side of the new border,
leaving a Protestant majority in the new six county Northern Ireland. Id. at 19-20. The other
32 counties comprising the Republic of Ireland are still, as they have always been, overwhelm-
ingly Catholic. See J. DARBY, supra note 2.
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Northern Ireland.2 3 A separate Northern Irish parliament was created
at Stormont, subject to supreme authority in London.24
Partition left Northern Ireland bitterly divided. The Loyalist major-
ity has wielded its political power 5 to secure its position and continued
ties with Britain.2 6 The Catholic minority, subjected to systematic dis-
crimination in areas such as employment, housing, and voting rights,27
has been dissatisfied with its treatment under Protestant majority rule
and manifests typical Irish antipathy towards the English.28
B. The Civil Rights Movement and the IRA
Catholic frustration over their second-class status led to a wide-
spread civil rights movement in 1968.29 As demands for reform re-
mained unheeded, tensions mounted between Catholic and Protestant
23. The Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 67, reprinted in 23 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 843 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter 1920 Act]. Six of Ulster's nine
counties became the new country of Northern Ireland. Id. § 1(2). The Republic became offi-
cially "free" with the Irish Free State (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1922, 13 Geo. 5, ch. 2,
reprinted in 23 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 901 (3d ed. 1970).
24. The legal relationship between Northern Ireland and Great Britain was set forth in
the 1920 Act, which reads in part: "Notwithstanding the establishment of the Parliament of
Northern Ireland... the supreme authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall
remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things [in Northern Ire-
land]." 1920 Act, supra note 23, ch. 67.
25. The Protestant majority has dominated the Northern Irish Parliament through the
Unionist Party. J. DARBY, supra note 2, ch. IV.
26. Id.
27. See DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION AP-
POINTED BY THE GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969, No. 532 (Lord Cameron, Chair-
man) [hereinafter Cameron Report]. Systematic Protestant discrimination against the
Catholic Irish has not been limited to Northern Ireland or the twentieth century. The policy
of comprehensive colonization of Ulster with loyal Protestants under James I was coupled
with a legal regime which reduced Catholics "to a state below servility." In the 1690s, an
exclusively Protestant Irish Parliament passed a series of "Penal Laws," which, inter alia,
excluded Catholics from the legal profession and from parliament, banished their bishops and
clergy, and forbade them from holding long leases on land, buying land from a Protestant, and
conducting schools. J. DARBY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
28. See Cameron Report, supra note 27, at 130; J. DARBY, supra note 2, at 48-79.
29. In 1969, the Governor of Northern Ireland formed a Commission under Lord Cam-
eron to study the civil rights movement and the outbreak of violence. The Cameron Report
concluded that the civil rights movement was caused by: a rising sense of injustice among the
Catholic population regarding housing practices; complaints of discrimination in Unionist (i.e.
Protestant) controlled authorities; complaints of gerrymandering to deny Catholics influence
in local government in proportion to their numbers; resentment over the government's failure
to investigate complaints or provide a remedy for them; resentment over existence of the exclu-
sively Protestant "B Special" paramilitary police force; and resentment over the continuation
of the 1922 Special Powers Act and the regulation made thereunder. Cameron Report, supra
note 27, at 140-145.
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communities until rioting erupted.3" Stormont proved unable to stem the
rising tide of violence and anarchy, and in 1969, British Army auxiliary
units were called in to assume routine police functions.31 Finally, in
March 1972 Northern Ireland's parliament was dissolved and direct rule
from London was reinstated. 32 To date the violence continues, albeit at a
lesser rate than in the initial years of the civil rights movement,33 and
Northern Irish self-rule has not been restored.34
The IRA, which has operated off and on throughout the twentieth
century in Ireland, reemerged in 1969. 31 The European Court of Human
Rights has described the IRA as a clandestine quasi-military organiza-
tion which accepts neither the existence of Northern Ireland as part of
the United Kingdom, nor recognizes the democratic order of the Repub-
lic.3 6 The IRA reorganized ostensibly to provide armed protection for
Catholic communities besieged by Protestant mobs.3 7 IRA activities,
30. Id. at pp. 50-52.
31. LONDON SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, NORTHERN IRELAND: A REPORT ON THE
CONFLICT 113-25 (1972) [hereinafter LSTIT].
32. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 14, at 157.
33. In the 16 years prior to 1985, 2400 people have died from acts of political violence and
25,000 others have been wounded. Getler, IRA's New High Stakes' Strategy More Deadly, San
Francisco Chron., Nov. 14, 1984, at A2, col. 1. See Spjut, Criminal Statistics and Statistics on
Security in Northern Ireland, 23 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 358, 361 (1983), which calculates
2062 deaths due to political violence from 1969 to 1980. The level of violence, however, has
not been constant from year to year. Spjut calculates that the number of unlawful killings and
other deaths connected with the security situation in Northern Ireland dropped from a high of
468 in 1972 to 76 in 1980. Id. at 361, table 2.
34. In 1985, Britain and the Republic of Ireland signed an agreement giving the latter a
formal role in the government of Northern Ireland for the first time. Art. II of the agreement
creates an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to deal with political matters, security, legal
matters (including the administration of justice), and the promotion of cross-border coopera-
tion. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
35. See supra note 3. The IRA has its roots in the guerilla army which fought the British
in the Anglo-Irish war in 1919 and 1920. J. BELL, supra note 3, ch. 1. The IRA has under-
gone cycles of relative activity and inactivity in every subsequent decade. Id. Prior to 1969,
outbreaks of IRA violence occurred in 1954 and 1956, which included armed attacks on
Northern Irish police barracks. Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1960).
The IRA reactivated on Easter of 1969 at the time the civil rights movement erupted. Ireland
v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 28 (1978).
36. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6.
37. Catholic civil rights marchers operated peacefully in 1968 and 1969 until they were
attacked by armed and organized Protestant paramilitary groups. Cameron Report, supra
note 27, 11 216-226. Further Protestant reaction to the civil rights movement prompted waves
of rioting, which focused on Catholic enclaves in Belfast and Derry. Stormont was unable or
unwilling to protect Catholic communities from Protestant extremists who were destroying
Catholic homes. As a result, the IRA, which had few members in mid-1969, gained increasing
support and turned to the defense of Catholic ghettos. LSTIT, supra note 31, at 134. The
Catholic community united temporarily behind the IRA, as heavy-handed tactics by the Brit-
ish Army, including the Bloody Sunday massacre, provided a flood of IRA recruits. White,
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however, soon expanded to include attacks on British troops and the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland's largely Protestant
police force.38 The IRA has also engaged in bombings and executions.39
By 1971, widespread civil unrest and the campaign of violence con-
ducted by the IRA had reached unprecedented proportions.' Stormont
became concerned that normal criminal procedures were inadequate to
control the IRA, widespread IRA intimidation often made it impossible
to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a criminal conviction against a
known IRA member, and IRA members escaped too easily across the
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic." In August 1971,
Stormont resurrected its power under the Civil Authorities (Special Pow-
ers) Act (Northern Ireland) 192242 to order "internment" (executive de-
tention without charge or trial) of suspected IRA members.43 Following
From Conflict to Violence: The Re-emergence of the IRA and the Loyalist Response, in NORTH-
ERN IRELAND BACKGROUND, supra note 14, at 16. The IRA established "no-go" zones in
which even British troops could not easily move. In these zones, the IRA acted as a police and
defense force. Id.; LSTIT, supra note 31, at 250.
38. The RUC is recruited largely from the Protestant community, and is military in out-
look and training. Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5 HUM.
RTS. 261, 264 (1976). Shooting at the security forces' patrols increased, and in 1971, for the
first time, soldiers numbered among the casualties. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 32.
The outmanned IRA adopted guerilla hit-and-run tactics against the numerically superior se-
curity forces. J. DOWNEY, supra note 14, at 194.
39. The IRA began bombing public places and carrying out sectarian reprisals against
Protestant extremists and members of the security forces. Between January and July 1971,
police statistics recorded a total of 304 explosions, including 94 for the month of July. Ireland,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) I 32. In February 1972, the IRA extended its bombing campaign to
England, where it was responsible for 86 bombings and shooting incidents in 1973. McVeigh,
O'Neill & Evans v. United Kingdom, Application Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77 (1981)
(Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 21. The IRA still grabs headlines with bombing attacks in
England, such as the 1983 Christmas bombing at Harrod's department store in London, The
Sunday Times (London), Dec. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1, and the nearly successful attempt on
Margaret Thatcher's life in 1984, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
40. By 1971, certain parts of Northern Ireland were in a state of "urban guerilla warfare."
LSTIT, supra note 31, at 281. The number of explosions had jumped from eight in 1969 to 155
in 1970. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) % 29. From August 1971 through March 1972,
there were 1130 bomb explosions and well over 2000 shooting incidents in Northern Ireland.
Id. % 48.
41. Id. I 36.
42. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5,
ch. 5 [hereinafter 1922 Act].
43. The 1922 Act granted the Northern Irish Minister for Home Affairs the power to
enact such regulations "as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order."
Id. § 1. Regulation 11 of the 1922 Act provided that:
(1) Any person authorised for the purpose by the Civil Authority... may arrest
without warrant any person whom he suspects of acting or of having acted or of
being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or mainte-
nance of order ....
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Stormont's dissolution, Britain nullified the 1922 Act and replaced it
with its own emergency powers legislation."
III. SPECIAL STATUS UNDER UNITED KINGDOM LAW
A. Special Category Status
IRA members caught in the internment sweeps were not treated like
ordinary criminals. When internment was reintroduced in 1971, detain-
ees were housed in hutted compounds and permitted to organize them-
selves like prisoners of war.45 When the British reasserted direct control
over Northern Ireland, they adopted policies which recognized the polit-
ical nature of terrorist offenses in two ways. First, in June 1972 they
introduced a policy of "special category status" for those detained or
convicted under emergency powers." Under this policy, any convicted
criminal sentenced to more than nine months imprisonment who claimed
political motivation and was accepted by a compound leader was ac-
corded special status.47 In practice, special status prisoners were allowed
to wear their own clothes, were exempted from work, were allowed food
parcels, could receive more frequent visitors, could spend their own
money in the prison canteen, and were segregated into compounds ac-
cording to the paramilitary organization to which they claimed
(2) Any person so arrested may, on the order of the Civil Authority, be detained
either in any of Her Majesty's prisons or elsewhere, as may be specified in the order,
upon such conditions as the Civil Authority may direct, until he has been discharged
by direction of the Attorney General or is brought before a Court of Summary
Jurisdiction.
Id.
The internment power was introduced in Ireland in 1916 during the "Easter Rising," an
armed rebellion against British rule. At that time over 1800 people were interned without
charge or trial. Lowry, supra note 38, at 268. Stormont was sharply criticized for resurrecting
on a larger scale than ever before "the power most offensive to international opinion." LSTIT,
supra note 31, at 300-01.
44. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch. 53, reprinted in 43 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1235 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter 1973 Act].
45. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 88. These prisoners were housed in hutted com-
pounds in specially prepared facilities, such as at Long Kesh and Magilligan. With the aboli-
tion of special category status, the compounds at Long Kesh were gradually replaced with 800
H-shaped prison buildings ("H Blocks") and the facility was renamed H.M. Maze Prison. Id.
at 88-89. The H Blocks have been the scene of several IRA hunger strikes, the most infamous
of which resulted in the deaths of imprisoned IRA member and Member of Parliament Bobby
Sands and nine other strikers. See J. FEEHAN, BOBBY SANDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF NORTH-
ERN IRELAND (1983).
46. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, No.
5847 (1975) (Lord Gardiner, Chairman) 1 105 [hereinafter Gardiner Report].
47. Id.
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allegiance.48
The special status system afforded IRA members a great deal of au-
tonomy. Each compound had a commanding officer who organized the
detainees' daily routine and gave his charges whatever military and polit-
ical training he thought appropriate. Prison officials did not enter the
compounds except for regular headcounts and occasional searches for
weapons. Under these circumstances, special status looked like a recog-
nition by British authorities of some form of political status for terrorist
offenders.49
Second, British emergency legislation itself distinguished terrorism
from ordinary offenses. Special police and judicial powers under the
emergency acts are available only to combat "terrorist" offenders and not
ordinary criminals.5 0 The word "terrorism" throughout this legislation
refers to "the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public
in fear."51
B. Criminalization
In 1975, the British government embarked on a campaign to deny
the political dimensions of the conflict in Northern Ireland and recast the
problem in terms of security, law, and order.52 The special status policy
was an obvious target for this new program. A British government-ap-
pointed committee, headed by Lord Gardiner, reported that accomoda-
tion of prisoners in special compounds was thoroughly unsatisfactory
and criticized the special status program for lending legitimacy to terror-
ist activities.53 The Gardiner Report recommended elimination of spe-
48. Id.
49. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 89.
50. 1973 Act, supra note 44, sched. 4.
51. Id. § 28(1) (emphasis added). The same definition is contained in § 31(1) of the 1978
Act. The Baker Report roundly criticized the retention of a definition of terrorism as a polit-
ical offense. It acknowledged the inconsistency in downplaying the political motivation of
terrorist violence through Britain's criminalization policy and maintaining a definition of ter-
rorism as "the use of violence for political ends." Baker stated that the emphasis should be
"on the crime and not the motive of the criminal" in order to divorce the act of terrorism from
its political ends. Baker Report, supra note 3, q 441. Accordingly, Baker recommended that
the 1978 Act be amended to abandon the "political ends" language in the definition of terror-
ism and that another definition be adopted which emphasizes terrorists' use of fear and coer-
cion. Id. q 440.
52. P. HILLYARD, Law and Order, in NORTHERN IRELAND BACKGROUND supra note 14,
at 43.
53. Gardiner Report, supra note 46, 1 105-110. Gardiner argued that special category
prisoners were more likely to emerge with an increased commitment to terrorism, special sta-
tus reduced the deterrent effect of the sentences, and there was no justification for granting
19861
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cial status for prisoners claiming political motivation:
[W]e have come to the conclusion that the introduction of special cate-
gory status was a serious mistake .... We can see no justification for
granting privileges to a large number of criminals convicted of very
serious crimes, in many cases murder, merely because they claim polit-
ical motivation. It supports their own view, which society must reject,
that their political motivation in some way justifies their crimes.54
Accordingly, the British government implemented a new policy of
"criminalization" of terrorist offenses." It announced that no prisoners
sentenced for crimes committed after February 1976 would be granted
special category status.16 In March 1980, this policy was extended to
prisoners charged after April 1, 1980 for crimes whenever committed. 7
There are still a small number of special category prisoners not affected
by these changes, most of whom are serving life sentences.5 IRA prison-
ers have continued to press their right to special status, which has caused
a number of conflicts with prison authorities.59
IV. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND SPECIAL STATUS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
IRA prisoners' claims to special status derive no support from inter-
national law. The European Commission on Human Rights (European
privileges to persons convicted of serious crimes because they claim political motivation. Id.
106-108.
54. Id. 107.
55. "Criminalization" was a wide-ranging program which eliminated special category sta-
tus and emphasized use of the police and courts rather than arrest by the military and execu-
tive detention.
56. Baker Report, supra note 3, % 451.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. As special category status was phased out, IRA prisoners were required to serve their
sentences according to an ordinary prison regime. Many of the prisoners refused to accept
prison clothing and were left with nothing but a blanket to wear in their cells. McFeeley v.
United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R. 161, 164, 1980 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 256 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
In 1978, having failed to gain concessions from prison authorities, IRA prisoners began a
"dirty protest," foregoing use of washing facilities and smearing cell walls with their own
excreta. This protest was followed by an abortive hunger strike launched on Oct. 27, 1980.
The strike was called off when one of the prisoners neared death, because the IRA believed
important concessions from authorities were forthcoming. These concessions proved unsatis-
factory. On March 1, 1981, Bobby Sands initiated a second hunger strike. He died on May 5,
66 days later. Nine others died with him before the strike was ended on Oct. 5, 1981. Sands'
death was all the more spectacular because he had been elected as a Member of Parliament
while in prison and during the hunger strike. J. DOWNEY, supra note 14, at 195-96; P. HILL-
YARD, supra note 52, at 53-55. See also J. FEEHAN, supra note 45.
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Commission),' in McFeeley v. United Kingdom,6 heard and rejected a
claim by certain IRA prisoners that they were entitled to special status
under the European Convention. Moreover, no support for special status
for terrorist offenders is found in Common Article Three,
62 Protocol 1,63
or Protocol III to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or in the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.
65
60. The European Commission is a body created under the European Convention on
Human Rights, a product of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe consists of eight-
een member states, all of whom have ratified the Convention: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Den-
mark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. F.
JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS 2 n.l (1975). It was founded in
1949 by the Western democracies to secure respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and
provide a mechanism for their enforcement. One of its first accomplishments was the promul-
gation of the European Convention, which was modeled in part after the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948. See generally id.; A.
ROBERTSON, supra note 5; F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(1974).
The Convention created the European Commission and the European Court of Human
Rights to hear petitions and adjudicate claims. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 19.
The Commission is unique in that it may accept claims not only from member states, id. art.
24, but from any person or non-governmental organization claiming a violation by one of the
member states. Id. art. 25. The Commission is only competent to deal with matters after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted. Id. art. 26. The Commission must reject any petition
which is anonymous, substantially the same as a matter it has already examined, or incompati-
ble with the provisions of the Convention. Id. art. 27. If the Commission accepts a petition, it
tries to effectuate a friendly settlement between the parties. Id. art. 30. If a solution is not
reached, the Commission draws up a report on the facts and states its opinion on whether a
country has breached its obligations under the Convention. Id. art. 31.
The European Convention also created the European Court of Human Rights, which
serves a limited appellate function. Only after the Commission has considered an application
and acknowledged the failure of friendly efforts to settle the issue can the Court hear an ap-
peal. Id. art. 47. Only the Commission or a member state, and not an individual petitioner,
may bring an appeal before the Court. Id. art. 44. The judgment of the Court is final, id. art.
52, and member states are bound by such decision. Id. art. 53.
61. McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R. 161, 1980 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM.
RTS. 256 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
62. Common Article Three to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [here-
inafter Common Article Three].
63. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I), opened for signa-
ture Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter PROTOCOL I].
64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol II), opened for sig-
nature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
65. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1977, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
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A. McFeeley v. United Kingdom
The elimination of special category status precipitated an escalating
war of nerves between IRA prisoners, who went on a "dirty protest"66 to
force the status reestablishment, and prison officials, who imposed disci-
plinary punishments. By 1978, the prisoners felt that they had been sub-
jected to a panoply of practices in violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights. Having exhausted all potential domestic remedies,
four IRA prisoners applied to have their case adjudicated by the Euro-
pean Commission in McFeeley v. United Kingdom.67
Among other charges,6" the prisoners' petition alleged that the Eu-
ropean Convention guaranteed them the right to special status as "polit-
ical prisoners" or "prisoners of war."69 The petitioners argued that
Article 9(1) of the Convention guaranteed them the right to special sta-
tus. Article 9(1) reads: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes ... freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."70
The prisoners argued that they were required to wear prison
uniforms and engage in prison work contrary to their "beliefs." Because
of the political nature of their acts, they argued, they "should not be
subjected to the same prison regime as other prisoners convicted of 'ordi-
nary' criminal offences." 71 The British government responded that" 'be-
lief' in article 9(1) relates to the holding of spiritual or philosophical
convictions which have an identifiable formal content," and does not in-
clude opinions or political convictions.7"
Without explanation, the Commission decided that the right to spe-
66. See supra note 59.
67. McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R. 161, 1980 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM.
Rrs. 256 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
68. The IRA prisoners charged British authorities with a number of practices in contra-
vention of the European Convention, including: unfair loss of remissions, earnings, and other
privileges; confinement with another prisoner in a one-man cell on a permanent basis; denial of
adequate washing facilities, causing inadequate personal hygiene and filthy cells; denial of
clothing and footwear other than prison clothing; being forced to eat cold food from the floor;
inadequate medical services; denial of proper toilet facilities; use of close body and strip
searches; denial of all exercise privileges; severely restricted diet; collective punishment, includ-
ing removal of furniture and religious literature; excessive use of isolation and solitary confine-
ment without adjudication; interference with religious practices; and refusal to subject
protesting female prisoners to similar harsh treatment. McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 3
E.H.R.R. at 165-82.
69. Id. at 191.
70. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 9(l).
71. McFeeley, 3 E.H.R.R. at 161.
72. Id.
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cial status for certain categories of prisoners was not "among the rights
guaranteed by the Convention or Article 9 in particular."73 It also held
that the freedom to manifest religion or belief in practice under Article
9(1) did not include a right for the petitioners to wear their own clothes
in prison.74 Finally, in a point not argued by any of the parties, the Com-
mission observed that the petitioners' claim to special status as political
prisoners could not be derived from existing norms of international law,
again without explanation.75
B. Other International Law
The McFeeley Commission failed to disclose which documents it
considered in concluding that the prisoners' claims to special status had
no support under international law. However, it probably considered, or
should have considered, Common Article Three, Protocol I, and Proto-
col II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism.76
Common Article Three and Protocol II govern the international law
of civil war. The IRA could plausibly be considered a rebel force operat-
ing in a civil war in Northern Ireland, and its imprisoned members could
be considered captured combatants. A discussion of both documents
therefore illuminates their treatment of special status for "captured
combatants."
1. Common Article Three
Common Article Three sets forth certain humanitarian standards
for the conduct of civil war, including the treatment of rebel
combatants.77 It applies to "armed conflict not of an international
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. t 43.
76. See TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 93-95.
77. Common Article Three states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one the the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sick-
ness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-named persons:
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character,""8 yet these terms are not defined. Commentators argue that
Article Three applies automatically to situations of "non-international
armed conflict,"7 9 whatever that may be, and that its provisions apply
not only to member states but to rebel "parties" as well. 0
The United Kingdom is a signatory to Common Article Three."
Whether Common Article Three applies to the conflict in Northern Ire-
land, however, is problematic because there is no criteria for determining
what constitutes an "armed conflict."8 2 The United Kingdom has denied
that Northern Ireland is in a state of armed conflict and that Article
Three should be applied. 3 If Article Three applies automatically to re-
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without pre-
vious judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties of the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status
of the Parties to the conflict.
Common Article Three, supra note 62.
78. Id. at 1.
79. See Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 29, 30
(1983).
80. The first paragraph says that "each Party to the conflict" is bound to apply the stan-
dards laid forth in the article [emphasis added]. On its face, this confers "Party" status to
organized rebel groups. One author argues in this context that "the judicial basis for imposing
legal obligations on persons or bodies other than governments is questionable," but observes
that a government arguably ratifies a convention on behalf of all its citizens, including rebels.
Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol 1I and its Relation to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 9, 12 (1983). For an
argument that insurgents are parties, see R. HULL, THE IRISH TRIANGLE: CONFLICT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 166-68 (1976). The "each Party" language became a bone of contention
during the drafting stages of Protocol II, for few nations wished to confer any recognition
upon rebels. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
81. See Common Article Three, supra note 62.
82. There is a genuine problem of interpretation because every use of arms in defi-
ance of a government could scarcely be said to give rise to an armed conflict making
article 3 applicable. The article itself attempts no definition in terms of levels of force
or of rebel control of territory that might assist in resolving the problem.
Lysaght, supra note 80, at 14; see also R. HULL, supra note 80, at 165-66.
83. Solf, Non-International Armed Conflicts, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 927, 931 n.10 (1982).
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bel parties as well as to member states, however, such denials are not
legally relevant.3 4
Common Article Three contains no provisions granting captured
combatants amnesty for their actions or the right to be treated differently
than prisoners convicted in ordinary courts. Moreover, the last para-
graph in the Article states that "[t]he application of the preceding provi-
sions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."8"
Thus, even if Common Article Three does apply to Northern Ireland, it
does not confer special status on IRA prisoners.
2. Protocol II
International regulation of non-international armed conflict was
clarified and expanded in 1977 with the promulgation of Protocol II to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.86 Protocol II avoided the vagueness
problems of Common Article Three by establishing criterion for its appli-
cation." There were hopes among the drafters of Protocol II that pris-
84. See supra note 80.
85. Common Article Three, supra note 62.
86. See supra note 64. Only 16 nations have ratified Protocol II: Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Libya, Jordan, Laos, Mauritania,
Niger, Sweden, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH, & W. SOLF, NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDI-
TIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 725 (1982) [hereinafter BoTHE,
COMMENTARY].
87. Art. 1(1) of Protocol II "develops and supplements" Common Article Three by set-
ting forth criterion for Protocol II's application. Specifically, it applies to all armed conflicts:
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.
Protocol II, supra note 64.
In the debates on Art. 1, drafting nations expressed concern that a widely applied Proto-
col II would encourage foreign interventions and endanger the sovereignty of states and their
competence to deal with internal matters. Accordingly, the nations deliberately set forth the
above criterion to create a high threshold of application. BOTHE, COMMENTARY, supra note
86, at 625-26. For a discussion of the application of the criterion set forth above, see Junod,
supra note 79, at 36-39; Solf, supra note 83, at 929; Bothe, Article 3 and Protocol I: Case
Studies of Nigeria and El Salvador, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 899, 906 (1982); BOTHE, COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 86, at 625-27.
Commentators disagree on how the Art. 1 threshold is met. Bothe states that the qualifi-
cations required in Art. I are objective, and the High Contracting Party has no discretion to
decide whether Protocol II applies on its territory. BOTHE, COMMENTARY, supra note 86, at
628. Solf takes the opposite view, maintaining that only the government involved can make
such a determination, unless the issue could be litigated in the International Court of Justice
with the consent of the parties concerned. Solf, supra note 83, at 932.
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oner-of-war status would be conferred on imprisoned combatants.88
Both Western and Third World nations, however, were reluctant to con-
fer this kind of legitimacy on participants in armed rebellion.89 Accord-
ingly, any language conferring "party" status on rebel forces or special
status for rebel prisoners was excised from the final draft.90
The United Kingdom is a signatory but not an adherent to Protocol
II.91 Even if it were an adherent, it is unclear whether the IRA can meet
the Article 1 criterion of being an "organized arm group."92 Thus, as
with Common Article Three, even if article 1 applied in Northern Ire-
land, it would not confer special status on IRA prisoners.
3. Protocol I
Protocol I supplements the humanitarian guarantees contained in
the Geneva Conventions on international armed conflict. By definition,
international armed conflicts under Protocol I include those "in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determina-
tion."93 Under Protocol I, "armed forces" are all armed groups under a
command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates, and a member
88. Lysaght, supra note 80, at 21.
89. Antipathy toward international regulation defining purely domestic matters clouded
the discussions. The Western states were willing to accord international standing to liberation
movements for humanitarian purposes, but were opposed to setting a precedent for the partici-
pation of such movements in other matters and for granting them international standing of
general scope. BOTHE, COMMENTARY, supra note 86, at 8-9. For their part, Third World
states were reluctant to confer any international recognition upon armed dissidents for fear of
undermining their own stability, even at the sacrifice of better protection for the victims of
non-international armed conflict. Id. A number of developing countries expressed concern
that Protocol II constituted an encouragement of rebellion in newly independent countries. Id.
at 669.
90. Junod, supra note 79, at 33; Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva
Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts, 30 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 416, 421 (1981).
Bothe notes that: "Protocol II does not confer a special status on members of the armed forces
of either side captured by the adverse party similar to the status of a prisoner of war in an
international armed conflict. The rebel does not enjoy any privilege with regard to acts com-
mitted during the rebellion." BOTHE, COMMENTARY, supra note 86, at 646 (emphasis added).
91. BOTHE, COMMENTARY, supra note 86, at 725.
92. Lysaght ventures an opinion that the IRA would indeed fail to meet the Art. 1
criterion:
The failure of terrorist groups [in Northern Ireland] to observe any of the laws of
warfare contained in Protocol II and the fact that they never really controlled any
territory or carried on concerted military operations could be cited ... to aid in
resisting [a claim of amnesty for persons participating in armed conflict at the end of
hostilities].
Lysaght, supra note 80, at 24.
93. Protocol I, supra note 63, art. 1(4).
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of such a force is a "combatant."94 Combatants who distinguish them-
selves from the civilian population while they are engaged in military
operations by carrying their arms openly are "prisoners of war" upon
capture by the adverse party.95
It is possible that the IRA could meet the definition of "armed
force," as it has an organized command structure responsible for the con-
duct of its subordinates.9 6 The IRA undoubtedly views its campaign as a
fight against colonial domination and alien occupation against the Brit-
ish, even though the majority in Northern Ireland has exercised its right
of self-determination in favor of links with Britain. The IRA is also a
covert organization which does not always distinguish itself from the ci-
vilian population while carrying on an operation. Thus, IRA members
probably would not qualify as "combatants" under Protocol I and would
derive no special status therefrom as prisoners.
a. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
The McFeeley Commission also could have considered whether in-
ternational extradition law grants IRA members special status as perpe-
trators of political offenses. Many international extradition treaties
contain a "political offense" exception, by which the individual may ap-
ply for political asylum and be immune from extradition when he is
charged with a political crime.97
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, how-
ever, removes terrorists from the political offense exception.98 The Con-
vention provides that certain offenses will not be regarded as political
offenses for the purposes of extradition.99 These offenses include kidnap-
ping and the use of bombs or automatic firearms, which are some of the
IRA trademarks. IRA members who flee to the Republic of Ireland for-
merly relied on political offense exceptions to avoid extradition to the
United Kingdom. 1" Under the Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism, IRA members are no longer considered political offenders, and
therefore enjoy no special status as prisoners.
94. Id. art. 43.
95. Id. art. 44.
96. See J. BELL, supra note 3.
97. See Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts--Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal of Re-
cent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265 (1980).
98. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 65, preamble.
99. Id. art. I.
100. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 95.
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V. THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO CIVIL UNREST AND
TERRORISM
Civil unrest and paramilitary attacks by the IRA have hampered
British control over Northern Ireland since the state's inception.,01 Brit-
ain has responded to what it perceives as a security problem by establish-
ing "temporary" or "emergency" state powers, which have lasted over 60
years.10 2 These special acts provide for sweeping powers of arrest, search
and seizure, trial without jury for terrorist offenders, and expedited pro-
curement and admission of confessions." 3 The United Kingdom has no-
tified the Council of Europe of the public emergency in Northern Ireland
and the exercise of special powers in derogation of rights guaranteed in
the European Convention."° This Note argues that Britain's use of spe-
cial powers in Northern Ireland, in derogation of binding human rights
guarantees, creates a class of special status prisoner, notwithstanding do-
mestic and international law. 10
5
A. The European Convention and Article 15
The United Kingdom has no constitution which guarantees the
rights of the individual against the power of the state. The word of Par-
liament is supreme and cannot be overturned by British courts.106 The
United Kingdom, however, is a signatory to the European Conven-
tion,10 7 which guarantees the rights of individual citizens of member na-
tions.1 8 Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention set forth minimum
guarantees for the arrest and trial of criminal suspects.109
101. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
102. Baker noted that Ireland has a long history of emergency legislation and special pow-
ers going back over two centuries to the Whiteboy Act of 1775. Baker Report, supra note 3,
15. The first special powers act in Northern Ireland was the 1922 Act, supra note 42.
103. See infra notes 120-73 and accompanying text.
104. See generally supra note 60 and accompanying text.
105. The Diplock Report itself supports this thesis to the extent it acknowledges that ter-
rorist offenders, unlike "ordinary" criminals, were not subject to "ordinary" judicial powers.
Diplock states that:
[I]f decisions as to guilt are to be made by tribunals, however independent or impar-
tial, which are compelled by the emergency to use procedures which do not comply
with [the European Convention], we do not think that a tribunal which fulfills this
function should be regarded or described as an ordinary court of law or as forming
part of the regular judicial system or should be composed of judges who also sit in
the regular criminal courts in Northern Ireland.
Diplock Report, supra note 7, V 12.
106. 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1003 (4th ed. 1980).
107. See supra note 60.
108. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
109. Id. art. 5 and art. 6.
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The question of derogation from the Convention's provisions in time
of public emergency arose during the Council of Europe's initial debates.
The two conflicting viewpoints were voiced by Irish and British dele-
gates. An Irish delegate "stressed the need to protect minorities from
deprivations of liberty such as occurred under the Special Powers Act in
Northern Ireland." The British delegate responded that "in times of
emergency the safety of the community is of the first concern."' 10 The
British view prevailed. The derogation provision, included in Article 15,
incorporated the principle of necessity, so that states would be free to
take measures in a state of emergency which would otherwise be
unlawful. 11
Article 15 states in part:
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of
the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating
from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international
law.112
Article 15 also provides that certain provisions of the Convention are
"non-derogable" even in times of emergency,' 13 and that any state avail-
ing itself of its derogation right must inform the Council of Europe of the
state's reasons and the measures taken.' To successfully justify an act
in contravention of the Convention's guarantees, a state must show that:
(1) a "public emergency" existed at the material time; (2) the measures
taken were in fact strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; and
(3) such measures were consistent with other obligations under interna-
110. See 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 104 (Council of Europe 1975); Hartman, supra note 6, at 4.
111. F. JACOBS, supra note 60, at 204. Other examples of derogation clauses in interna-
tional human rights documents are Art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and Art. 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Schreuer, Derogation of
Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The Experience of the European Convention
on Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 113, 114-15 (1982). Even the United States
Constitution has a clause empowering Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus "when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Common Article Three and Protocol II are not derogable. BOTHE, COMMENTARY, supra note
86, at 653. Solf, supra note 83, at 927.
112. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 15(1).
113. Id. art. 15(2). Those provisions are: Art. 2, dealing with right to life "except in respect
of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war"; Art. 3, prohibiting torture and inhuman or de-
grading treatment; Art. 4(1), prohibiting slavery; and Art. 7, dealing with certain criminal
offenses and penalties.
114. Id. art. 15(3).
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tional law. 115
The European Commission and Court decide whether a "public
emergency" within the meaning of Article 15 exists and whether the
measures taken were strictly required by the circumstances.116 They
will, however, give some deference to the judgment of the nation con-
cerned, observing that it is "in a better position than the international
judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the
nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it."'1 17
From 1957 until 1984, the United Kingdom had notified the Coun-
cil of Europe of the public emergency in Northern Ireland and of the
special powers in derogation from the European Convention. 1 " In Ire-
land v. United Kingdom, the European Court, applying its deferential
standard of scrutiny, held that the public emergency in fact existed and
that the measures taken by the United Kingdom were strictly required by
the circumstances 19
B. Extraordinary Powers
The United Kingdom has derogated from the European Convention
in favor of legislation aimed at maintaining order in Northern Ireland.
This section discusses the effect of these powers on three crucial areas of
criminal procedure: (1) arrest, detention and seizure; (2) right to jury
trial; and (3) admissibility of confessions.
1. Arrest, Detention, and Seizure
Soon after the creation of Northern Ireland, the new parliament as-
sumed emergency powers under the 1922 Act.'20 This Act was enabling
115. F. JACOBS, supra note 60, at 204.
116. Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 27 (1960).
117. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). For a discussion of the
derogation jurisprudence under the European Convention, see Hartman, supra note 6, at 23-
35.
118. See generally note 60 and accompanying text.
119. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 132 (1978). The existence of a public emergency
was not disputed by the parties. Id. 205. For a criticism of the Court's unanimous finding
that the measures taken by the United Kingdom were strictly required by the circumstances,
see Hartman, supra note 6, at 32-34. The reader may wonder why, since Britain's notice of
derogation continued through 1980, Art. 15 was not an issue in the McFeeley application. The
issue of whether alleged violations of the Convention were justified on Art. 15 grounds has
normally been addressed on the merits and usually cannot be disposed of at the level of admis-
sibility. F. JACOBS, supra note 60, at 208. Since all the McFeeley allegations were reserved or
dismissed as inadmissible, the Commission never had occasion to consider whether a "public
emergency" still existed in Northern Ireland and whether the prison authorities' tactics ex-
ceeded the those permitted by Art. 15.
120. 1922 Act, supra note 42.
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legislation, which provided the government with the power "to take all
such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving
the peace and maintaining order... ."121 The regulations gave security
forces almost unlimited power to, inter alia, enter and search any prem-
ises, 122 stop, search and seize any vehicle 123 or person, 124 arrest without
warrant and detain any person for forty-eight hours for interrogation, 125
and detain indefinitely any person without charge or trial. 126 It further
provided that anyone acting in a manner "prejudicial" to peace and or-
der could be imprisoned even though his or her action was not specifi-
cally proscribed in the regulations.' 27 The 1922 Act remained in force
until it was finally repealed in 1973.128
The 1922 Act's modem successors are the Emergency Provisions
Act of 1978129 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1984.130 While
less draconian than its predecessor, the 1978 Act still retains many of the
same features. Section 11 provides that the police may arrest without
warrant any person they suspect of being a terrorist, and for that purpose
may enter and search any premises. 3'1 There is no requirement that the
suspicion be reasonable, or the arrest be for the purpose of bringing the
suspect before a court. The suspect may be detained for up to seventy-
two hours132 and forced to have his photograph and fingerprints
taken. 133
The Secretary of State retains modified powers of internment under
Section 12 and Schedule 1 of the 1978 Act. 134 Section 13 provides that
121. Id. art. 1(1).
122. Id. reg. 4, reprinted in Cameron Report, supra note 27, at 105-06.
123. 1922 Act, supra note 42, reg. 5.
124. Id. reg. 6.
125. Id. reg. 10.
126. Id. reg. 11.
127. Id. art. 2(4).
128. The 1922 Act originally was to remain in force for only one year, but "in view of the
continued existence of subversive organisations" it was annually re-enacted until 1928, when it
was extended for five years. Id., introductory notes. The 1922 Act, despite its "emergency"
nature, was made permanent in 1933. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern
Ireland) 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5 ch. 12, sched. 2, reprinted in 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND 182 (2d ed. 1950). The 1922 Act was repealed by the 1973 Act, supra note 44. One
author comments that while the origin of the Special Powers Act of 1922 was unremarkable,
the fact that it remained in force for 50 years could hardly be justified in an ostensibly demo-
cratic state. Lowry, supra note 38, at 270.
129. 1978 Act, supra note 3.
130. 1984 Act, supra note 4.
131. 1978 Act, supra note 3, § 11(1)-(2).
132. Id. § 11(3).
133. Id. § 11(4).
134. Id. § 12, sched. 1.
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the police may arrest without warrant any person whom they suspect of
committing, having committed, or being about to commit any offense
under the Act."35 For this purpose, as in Section 11, the police may enter
and search any premises without a warrant and seize anything they sus-
pect of being connected with the offense. 13 6
Section 14 grants the British military in Northern Ireland power to
arrest without warrant anyone they suspect of committing or about to
commit "any offence" and detain them for not more than four hours. 1 37
For the purpose of arresting someone under this section, the military
may enter and search any premises.138 The military may also enter any
premises "other than a dwelling-house" to search for munitions or trans-
mitters, 139 and enter any premises whatsoever whenever "necessary to do
so in the course of operations." 1" Upon order by or on behalf of the
Secretary of State, the military may take possession of any property,
place it in a "state of defence," detain, move or destroy it, or "do any
other act interfering with any public right or with any private rights of
property."141
The 1984 Act is a continuation of the original Prevention of Terror-
ism Act of 1974, when extraordinary powers of arrest and detention were
introduced in Great Britain in the wake of an IRA bombing campaign in
Birmingham.' 42 This Act enables the Secretary of State to exclude from
any part of the United Kingdom "persons concerned in terrorism
designed to influence public opinion or Government policy with respect
to affairs in Northern Ireland."' 14 3 Under Section 12, a British constable
may arrest without warrant anyone he or she reasonably suspects is a
terrorist or is subject to an exclusion order.1" A person so arrested may
be held for 48 hours, or up to five days if specified by the Secretary of
State. 145 Section 13 grants the Secretary of State broad powers for the
search and arrest of suspected terrorists entering or leaving Northern
Ireland. 146
Many of the above provisions contravene Articles 5 and 6 of the
135. Id. § 13(1).
136. Id. §§ 13(2)-13(3).
137. Id. § 14(1).
138. Id. § 14(3).
139. Id. § 15.
140. Id. § 19(1).
141. Id. § 19(2).
142. P. HILLYARD, supra note 52, at 42.
143. 1984 Act, supra note 4, preliminary note.
144. Id. § 12.
145. Id. § 12(4)-(5).
146. Id. § 13.
[Vol. 9
Terrorists and Special Status
European Convention. Article 5(1)(c) requires that an arrest be made
upon reasonable suspicion of an offense being committed and for the pur-
pose of bringing the offender before a competent court. Neither Sections
11, 13, nor 14 of the 1978 Act contain either requirement, nor does Sec-
tion 12 of the 1984 Act require arrest for the purpose of bringing the
offender to court. 147 In addition, Section 14 of the 1978 Act violates
Article 5(2), which requires that an arrestee be given a reason for the
arrest.1 41 Section 12 and Schedule 1, although unused since 1975, con-
travene almost every one of the provisions of Articles 5 and 6,14 particu-
larly the guarantees to a fair and public hearing before an impartial
tribunal. 150
2. The Right to Jury Trial
In 1972, a special commission chaired by Lord Diplock reviewed
procedures in Northern Irish Courts for convicting those suspected of
terrorist activity.15 1 Concern over IRA intimidation of witnesses and ju-
rors, as well as the difficulty of selecting an unbiased jury from Ulster's
highly-polarized community, led the Commission to recommend aboli-
tion of trial by jury. 52 The British government accepted the Diplock
Commission's findings and immediately incorporated them into the 1973
Emergency Provisions Act. 153 Courts utilizing these new procedures are
called "Diplock courts."
Section 7 of the 1978 Act provides that trial of "scheduled offences"
will be held before a Diplock court without a jury.' 4 Section 7 also pro-
vides that when an indictment contains both scheduled and non-sched-
uled offenses, the Diplock court will hear all charges.' 55 The scheduled
offenses include murder, riot, kidnapping, illegal use of explosives and
firearms, prison escape, and hijacking.' 56 The Attorney General for
Northern Ireland has the power to certify in a particular case that certain
crimes, such as murder, manslaughter, and assault occasioning actual
147. See Baker Report, supra note 3, % 264, 340.
148. Id. T 264.
149. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
150. See European Convention, supra note 5, art. 6(1).
151. Diplock Report, supra note 7.
152. Id. T 35-41.
153. 1973 Act, supra note 44; TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 38; Lowry, supra note 38, at
296.
154. 1978 Act, supra note 3, § 7(1).
155. Id. § 7(3).
156. Id. sched. 4. The list of scheduled offenses is quite long and contains over 48 different
crimes.
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bodily harm, should not be treated as scheduled offenses.157
3. Admissibility of Confessions
The Diplock Commission's report also contained recommendations
to relax the common law rules governing admissibility of confessions.""
This recommendation was incorporated into the 1973 Emergency Provi-
sions Act and carried through into the 1978 Act. Under Section 8 of the
1978 Act, a confession elicited from a criminal suspect will be admitted
into evidence unless the accused was subjected to "torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment." 15 9 This language was borrowed from Article 3
of the European Convention, 160 which has been held by the European
Court not to include "occasional rough treatment or slaps about the
head."'' In R. v. McCormick, a Northern Irish court held that this in-
terpretation of Section 8 was persuasive and concluded that the interro-
gator could legally use moderate degrees of physical mistreatment to
induce a confession.' 62
Section 8 severely undermines the English common law doctrine of
voluntariness, which prohibits the admission of confessions obtained by
inducement or coercion.' 6 3 A confession given involuntarily would be
admissible in a Diplock court unless the tactics used to obtain the confes-
sion rose to the level of torture or inhuman treatment.' 64
The Section 8 standard has worked hand in hand with British inter-
rogation practices to procure confessions from suspected terrorists. In
Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Court held Britain in violation
of Article 3 of the European Convention for using certain torturous in-
terrogation techniques on suspects during the internment period. 165
Although Britain pledged to abandon use of those particular techniques,
157. Id.
158. Diplock Report, supra note 7, 1 73-92.
159. 1978 Act, supra note 3, § 8(2).
160. Art. 3 states that: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." European Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
161. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 32.
162. 1977 N. Ir. 105, 111, discussed in Baker Report, supra note 3, at 1 192.
163. 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 410 (4th ed. 1976). The Diplock Report de-
cried the "voluntariness" doctrine as developed by the British and Northern Irish courts as
"detailed technical rules and practice" which were "hampering the course of justice in the case
of terrorist crimes." Diplock Report, supra note 7, § 87.
164. See 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 414 (4th ed. 1976) for examples of confes-
sions ruled "inadmissible as having been induced by (1) fear, threats or pressure by a person in
authority, (2) promises of favour or advantage by such a person, or (3) a combination of such
threats and promises." Id. § 414. Any of these confessions would have been admissible under
the Section 8 standard.
165. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 32 (1978). The security forces
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pressure remained on the police in Northern Ireland to secure convic-
tions of suspected terrorists following the abandonment of internment in
1975. Complaints of psychological and physical mistreatment in newly-
constructed interrogation centers continued.
166
In 1979, Britain empanelled the Bennett Committee to investigate
these allegations. The Committee confirmed that ill-treatment of sus-
pects had occurred. 167 The Bennett report contained a number of recom-
mendations to improve supervision of interrogation and eliminate future
abuses.1 68 These recommendations were adopted by the British
government.1
69
Studies have shown that the Diplock courts indeed rely heavily on
confessions admitted under section 8 to secure convictions. During 1976
and 1977, seventy to ninety percent of the convictions obtained under the
1978 Act were based wholly or primarily on confessions made to the
police and admitted under section 8.170 A study of 240 cases in 1979
showed that fifty-seven percent were based solely on a confession offered
against the defendant, and twenty-nine percent more were based on a
confession along with some other evidence which was usually insufficient
to justify a conviction on its own. 17 1 In three-quarters of these cases in
which the defendant contested all charges but was convicted on all or
most of them, the prosecutor relied heavily on an alleged confession.
172
The admissibility and reliability of a confession were the only disputed
legal issues in most of these trials. 173
4. British Security Policy
British special powers have been on the books for over sixty consec-
utive years, despite their supposedly "emergency" nature. Sixteen semi-
annual reviews of the Emergency Provisions Acts by the British Parlia-
ment have resulted in only one significant change: the power of intern-
used five sensory deprivation techniques during interrogation: "hooding," subjection to white
noise, sleep deprivation, continuous wall standing, and deprivation of food and water.
166. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 39. One center was built at Castlereagh and the
other at Gough.
167. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCE-
DURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979 Cmnd. Ser. 5, No. 7497 (His Honor H.G. Bennett,
Chairman).
168. Id.
169. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 39.
170. Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland, 8
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 284, 299 (1982).
171. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 44.
172. Id. at 76-77.
173. Id. at 86.
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ment, unused since 1975, can now be invoked only by Parliament.174
The special powers acts have received criticism from even United
Kingdom authorities. In 1969, a group under the Ulster Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that the 1922 Act was "demonstrably despotic, and much
of it meaningless or unenforceable or both." '17 5 At the time of the enact-
ment of the 1978 Act, then Secretary of State William Whitelaw admit-
ted that it contained "some features unpalatable to a democratic society.
Her Majesty's government does not disguise the fact that it imposes seri-
ous limitations on the traditional liberty of the subject."' 17 6
United Kingdom security policy in Northern Ireland has gone
through two phases since the eruption of the civil rights movement.
From 1971 to 1975, Northern Irish and British authorities emphasized
detention without trial and use of the military to apply security policy. 177
Internment was applied ineffectively, and in fact exacerbated the security
problem.' 78 The power of internment has not been used since 1975 and
all internees have been released. 179
Since 1975, British security policy has shifted to favor both criminal
prosecution of suspected terrorists in Diplock courts and an enhanced
role in arrest and investigation for the RUC. 180 The various provisions
of the 1978 and 1984 acts interact to allow security forces in Northern
Ireland enormous powers. They may theoretically break into the home
174. Foley, supra note 170, at 292.
175. LSTIT, supra note 31, at 199.
176. Id. at 294.
177. Boyle, Human Rights and Political Resolution in Northern Ireland, 9 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 156, 164 (1982). Due to the extraordinary level of violence in 1971, Northern Irish
authorities determined that it was necessary to strike at suspected terrorists against whom
sufficient evidence could not be marshalled for an ordinary trial. Ireland v. United Kingdom,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 36 (1978). By the end of 1971, 1576 people had been arrested and
held under the 1922 Act, of whom 934 were subsequently released. LSTIT, supra note 31, at
269-70. Those who were not released remained in special facilities and were not charged with
any offense or permitted to go to trial. Lowry, Ill-Treatment, Brutality and Torture: Some
Thoughts Upon the "Treatment" of Irish Political Prisoners, 22 DE PAUL L. REv. 553, 559
(1973).
178. LSTIT, supra note 31, at 269-70. There is evidence that the internment power was
applied in a haphazard and provocative fashion. Security forces had trouble identifying IRA
members, including the Provisional IRA's command structure. Targets for internment were
thus picked in a less than reliable fashion. Many of those seized were merely IRA "sympathiz-
ers" or politicians who could cause trouble in the wake of internment. Id. at 261-64. Intern-
ment in fact backfired. Far from giving Stormont the upper hand on the security situation, it
sparked unprecedented waves of violence. "[Authorities were] appalled by the intensity of
Catholic reaction [to internment]. They had foreseen rioting, but not warfare .... Id. at
269. Internment may indeed have played into the IRA's hands by driving moderate Catholics
away from the middle ground and toward the IRA. Id. at 270.
179. Id. at 165; TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 24.
180. See Baker Report, supra note 3, 33-34.
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of a suspected terrorist and arrest him without a warrant, even though
the suspicion was unreasonable and the arrest was connected with no
particular offense. The suspect could be detained for up to seventy-two
hours and subjected to any manner of interrogation short of torture or
degrading treatment, knowing that any confession thus obtained would
not be thrown out of court. Upon procuring a confession, they could
bring him before a judge sitting without a jury, who could then convict
him on the basis of that confession alone.
In almost all cases of detention in Northern Ireland the security
forces have relied on their broader powers under the Emergency Acts in
preference to their normal power to arrest for specific criminal of-
fenses.""1 Moreover, statistics on emergency arrest and subsequent
charges suggest that security forces abused their powers by detaining
those whom they could not reasonably suspect had committed an offense.
From September 1977 to August 1978, 2814 persons were arrested under
the then-current Emergency Provisions Act. Of those, only a third were
charged with specific offenses. 182 Over 3867 people were arrested in the
first ten months of 1980, and of those less than ten percent were eventu-
ally prosecuted. 183 This compares with an eighty to ninety percent aver-
age in Britain.' 84 In effect, the emergency acts authorized massive
"trawling operations" by which security forces swept up numerous indi-
viduals guilty of no offense, but who they thought might be involved in or
have information about terrorist activity.185
The Section 8 standard has allowed security forces to rely less on
gathering independent evidence of the suspected terrorists' crime and
more on procuring confessions as the primary tool of evidence gather-
ing."16 Correspondingly, Diplock courts are called upon less to evaluate
independent evidence of the accused's guilt or innocence than to rule on
the admissibility of confessions, which are often deemed dispositive of
the defendant's guilt."8 7
181. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 29.
182. Id. at 30.
183. Foley, supra note 170, at 294-95.
184. Id.
185. See TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 30.
186. Foley, supra note 170, at 299; TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 38. The Diplock
Commission knew that many confessions obtained during prolonged interrogation were being
rejected in court, which compelled the Commission to lower the standard for the admission of
confessions to support interrogation practices. Diplock Report, supra note 7, 83.
187. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 3, at 86.
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C. The Baker Report
In 1984, the British government commissioned Sir George Baker to
review and comment on the operation of the 1978 and 1984 Acts in
Northern Ireland. The Baker Report argued for the reform, but not the
repeal, of those acts.
1. Arrest, Detention, and Seizure
The Baker Report took differing views of the power of internment
and other special powers of arrest, search, and seizure. With respect to
internment, unused since 1975, Baker noted certain arguments in favor
of its retention: 1) the situation in Northern Ireland could deteriorate
again and the power would then be needed; 188 2) repeal would demon-
strate lack of resolve to deal with outrageous killings;18 9 3) if the power
were again needed, the element of surprise would be lost due to the time
and publicity needed to reobtain parliamentary approval;19 and 4) in-
ternment had been counter-productive only because it had been badly
and indiscriminately used.' 91
Baker rejected these arguments, noting that the retained powers of
internment were an "international embarrassment."' 192 In response to ar-
guments for retention, he found that: if chaos returned to Northern Ire-
land, there would be little hope for selective or discriminate
internment;193 human rights groups regard the internment power as
"anathema to the rule of law;"' 194 internment is inconsistent with the em-
phasis on police investigation and the policy of criminalization;' 95 and
internment provides fuel for Republican propaganda. 196 Accordingly,
the Baker Report recommended the repeal of the internment power.
197
The Baker Report, however, recommended against the repeal of the
other powers of arrest, detention, and seizure contained in the 1978 and
1984 Acts. Citing the difficulty in obtaining evidence against suspected
terrorists through normal procedures, 198 it concluded that the desire to
arrest and punish perpetrators of "dreadful crimes" was incompatible
188. Baker Report, supra note 3, 1 231.
189. Id. 1 232.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. 1 230.
193. Id. 1 233.
194. Id. 1 235.
195. Id.
196. Id. 1 236.
197. Id.
198. Id. $V 255-256.
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with the desire to cut back on special powers.' 99
The Baker Report instead urged for a number of smaller-scale re-
forms designed to curb potential abuse. It recommended first that the
time in which a suspected terrorist could be arrested and detained under
Section 11 of the 1978 Act be reduced from seventy-two to forty-eight
hours.2" The Report also recommended that Sections 11, 13, and 14 of
the 1978 Act be amended to require "reasonable suspicion," an objective
standard, where they now require merely "suspicion," a subjective stan-
dard.2"' Finally, Baker noted confusion over the mulitiplicity of arrest
powers available to security forces. He thus recommended that Sections
11 and 13 of the 1978 Act and Section 12 of the 1984 Act be synthesized
into one arrest power for Northern Ireland.202
The Baker Report's recommendation to repeal the power of intern-
ment should be applauded because detention without trial is abhorrent to
the values of a western democratic legal system. The Report, however,
did not go far enough in critically analyzing the other arrest powers.
Throughout the Report, Baker placed the burden of proof on those who
advocate change. Baker stated that:
I have become increasingly more convinced that any provision of the
[1978 Act] which may save even one life or bring even one guilty ter-
rorist to conviction and sentence should be retained until the paramili-
tary forces foreswear terrorism unless there is a powerful convincing
reason for repeal or amendment.203
Under this rationale, the British government would be justified in imple-
menting increasingly Orwellian security measures until the IRA lays
down its arms. For example, placing audiovisual monitors in every
Catholic home in Northern Ireland would serve the stated objective.
Such a measure, however, would strike an improper balance between se-
curity and liberty in a democratic society.
In addition, Baker dismissed without serious consideration the argu-
ment that the IRA has been sustained by "an over-emphasis on security
policy at the expense of politics," which has contributed to Catholic
alienation. 2" Finally, Baker's proposed reforms do nothing to change
the fact that special powers arrests may be used for surveillance and har-
199. Id. 1 254.
200. Id. 11 270-279.
201. Id. 11 283, 346.
202. Id. t 304.
203. Id. 18.
204. Id. 1 256 (quoting Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald in The Times (London),
Dec. 23, 1983).
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assment. He proposed only that the RUC "be told" to arrest only after
checking and double-checking reasonable suspicion that the person has
been involved with terrorists' acts.2°5
2. Jury Trial
a. Return to Jury Trial
The Baker Report completely rejected any change in the current
system of trial of scheduled offenses without a jury. Baker noted that
jury intimidation and sectarian verdicts originally motivated Lord
Diplock to recommend abolition of trial by jury.2°6 Baker then cited
certain opinions that the threat of juror intimidation was even greater in
1984 than in 1973.207 He also observed that the right to trial by jury in
criminal cases has been eroded in portions of the former Common-
wealth, 20 and juries have almost disappeared in civil cases in England
and Wales. 20 9 The Baker Report thus recommended that trial without
jury be retained.21 0
Baker's analysis is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, he ac-
knowledges the hallowed position of jury trial in criminal cases in Eng-
lish jurisprudence 211 and cites Gardiner's observation that "trial by jury
is the best form of trial for serious cases and ... should be restored in
Northern Ireland as soon as this becomes possible. '2 12 Despite these ac-
knowledgments, Baker again improperly placed the burden on those who
advocate jury trials to show that juries would not be intimidated.213 In-
205. Id. 1 289-292. By the RUC's own figures, between 76% and 90% of those arrested
under the special powers acts are released without charge. Id. 1I 276, 289.





211. Baker cites Lord Devlin in L. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1970), who said: "[O]f all the
institutions that have been created by English law, there is none other that has a better claim to
be called.., the privilege of the Common People of the United Kingdom .... it is one which no
other European people enjoys." Baker Report, supra note 3, 1 104.
212. Id. 1 102. Diplock's observation comports with the English tradition of trying cases
at common law before a jury, particularly serious crimes. In his treatise on the English court
system, Hanbury notes:
[I]n cases coming before the courts of Common Law, and more especially in criminal
trials before itinerant justices, [trial by jury] became more than a bulwark against
injustice .... [S]ince the inception of the jury system, it has been widely agreed that
before any person is convicted of a serious crime it is a valuable safeguard to liberty
that twelve ordinary citizens, rather than just one professional judge, should be satisfied
of his guilt [emphasis added].
H. HANBURY & D. YARDLEY, ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW (5th ed. 1979).
213. Baker Report, supra note 3, 1 102.
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stead, the burden should have been on Baker to show why Britain should
retain a judicial system abhorrent to common law jurisprudence.
Second, merely because the right to jury trial in criminal cases is
disappearing in other parts of the world does not mean that it should
disappear in a common law democracy, or that a non-jury system is more
just. Third, Baker found that terrorists are tried by juries in France and
Italy, which take extraordinary precautions for the jury's safety.214 The
Report fails to analyze how the system works in those countries or
whether the same procedures could be copied in Northern Ireland.
Fourth, Baker noted a suggestion that juries be imported from Eng-
land to try scheduled cases. The Report dismissed this suggestion as im-
practical, without a discussion of its merits.215 The Report also failed to
consider whether suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland could be extra-
dited to England for trial by jury.
Fifth, Baker dismissed without adequate discussion certain argu-
ments in favor of a right to jury trial: intimidation of jurors was never
proved; judge trial twists the process in the prosecution's favor; trial
without jury breeds lack of confidence in the judiciary; non-jury trials
place extra burdens on judges; and the return of juries would emphasize
the responsibility of the citizen in the administration of justice.216 Baker
concluded with the rhetorical question, "Would there be juries in any
trials if [the IRA] came to power?" '217 as if the IRA's supposed lack of
respect for jury trials justified a similar attitude by the British.
b. Composition of the Court
The Baker Committee also heard proposals for changing the compo-
sition of the court to minimize the possibility of abuse if juries could not
be reinstated. The proposals seriously considered were for three-judge
courts and trial by a judge with lay assessors or Resident Magistrates
(RMs). It was suggested that reform would relieve concerns about trial
by judge alone and provide an additional safeguard against unjust
decisions. 218
Baker first considered the record of three-judge courts for criminal
cases in India and the Republic of Ireland. In 1919, India created a
three-judge court to try offenses connected with anarchical or revolution-





218. Id. 110, 112.
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on the success of these courts and was unable to discover whether they
encountered "any procedural difficulties anticipated or real." '219
Since 1939, Ireland has empanelled special courts to try scheduled
offenses under the Offences Against the State Act of 1939, which nor-
mally consist of a High Court judge presiding over two judges from the
circuit court and district court.22' Baker cited a report which praised the
Irish special courts for discharging the difficult dual function of ruling on
the admissibility of confessions and the weight to attach to them. This
report concluded that the special courts had operated well when presided
over by a High Court judge and when adequately covered by the press.
It made no mention of any of the procedural difficulties feared by
Diplock and Gardiner.221
Despite his seeming lack of care in gathering relevant information
and despite the record of the Irish special courts, Baker dismissed the
notion of a three-judge court on administrative and procedural grounds.
The Report cited inter alia the backlog of non-jury cases in Northern
Ireland,222 a shortage of trained judges,223 and trivial concerns over
whether three separate judgments would issue, and how and by whom
teams would be picked.224
The Baker Report also rejected the notion of a court with two lay
assessors or RMs assisting the judge. Baker again cited certain minor
procedural concerns,22 as well as the more substantial concern that lay
assessors, like jurors, would be subject to threats and intimidation.226 In
rejecting the idea of having two RMs serve on the Diplock courts, the
Report cited the RMs' lack of criminal trial experience and opposition to
the idea from the RMs and judges themselves.227
The Baker Report's rejection of a modified court structure is unsat-
isfactory because it fails adequately to assess the history of three-judge
criminal trials in other nations and ignores the praiseworthy record of





223. Id. 11 115-118.
224. Id. 1119.
225. Id. 1127. For example, Baker was concerned with whether the judge would sum up
or read his notes to the lay assessors or write a judgment, and whether the judge should record
a dissent.
226. Id.
227. Id. 1 128.
[Vol. 9
Terrorists and Special Status
administrative and procedural difficulties could be overcome,22 8 he again
held firm to the status quo by placing the burden of proof on the "re-
formers."22 9 Baker ultimately was persuaded by bald assertions that
modified courts for trial of scheduled offenses would be a "recipe for
disaster" and "would tend to destroy public confidence in the
judiciary."230
c. Descheduling Offenses
In order at least partially to facilitate desires to return to trial by
jury in Northern Ireland, the Baker Report recommended that the Attor-
ney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions be granted new and
greater powers to "deschedule" and "certify out" scheduled offenses.23'
In this context "deschedule" means removing an entire offense from the
list of scheduled offenses in the 1978 Act, and "certify out" means certi-
fying that an individual case is not to be treated as a scheduled offense.232
Under this plan, these officials would be in a better position to ensure
that extraordinary judicial procedures which deny a defendant the right
to jury trial are not applied to non-terrorists.233
3. Admissibility of Confessions
Baker felt that Diplock court judges had applied Section 8 with
"good sense," and recommended retaining it with certain modifica-
tions.234 First, he observed that Section 8 as interpreted by Ireland v.
United Kingdom and R. v. McCormick left room for interrogation meth-
ods "usually condemned in the civilized world. '23 5 Baker accordingly
recommended that it be redrafted to specifically exclude violence.236
Furthermore, Baker recommended that Section 8 be modified explicitly
to include the judge's common-law discretion to exclude an otherwise
admissible confession.2 37
With its Section 8 analysis the Baker Report again struck a balance
between security and liberty, which weighed heavily toward the former.
Baker decried the common law voluntariness standard as "detailed tech-
228. Id. 7 119.
229. Id. 7121.
230. Id. 7119.
231. Id. 77 130-150.
232. Id. 131.
233. Id. 130.
234. Id. 7 188.
235. Id. 7 189-192.
236. Id. 1 200.
237. Id. $% 194-200.
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nical rules and practice" which enabled "the guilty" to be acquitted.238
The Report also cast aspersions on "[Ihe so-called right to silence, which
some.. . still regard as a luxury that any civilized society faced with
increasing violent crime can ill afford .... Under this reasoning,
Britain may never restore common-law safeguards against admission of
coerced confessions.
D. The Withdrawal of Derogation
In 1984, the British government reviewed its notice of derogation to
the Council of Europe under Article 15, in light of the need for and oper-
ation of the emergency legislation in force. On August 22, 1984, Britain
announced that:
[T]he government is satisfied that the measures currently taken to deal
with the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom are fully in accord
with both the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]
and the [European Convention] and that it would be right now to
withdraw the United Kingdom's notices of derogation from these
instruments. 24
Britain supported its decision by noting that some emergency provi-
sions were no longer in force, in particular detention without trial.
241
While maintaining that the 1978 and 1984 Acts were still necessary to
deal with the situation in Northern Ireland, Britain concluded that these
emergency powers are consistent with the European Convention.242
Britain's withdrawal of its notice of derogation under Article 15 is
suspect for a number of reasons. First, the power of detention without
trial, while dormant since 1975, remains in the 1978 Act and may be
resurrected at anytime.243 Second, the Baker Report itself acknowledged
that Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the 1978 Act and Section 12 of the
1984 Act violate Article 5 of the Convention.2"4
Under Lawless and Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Com-
mission and Court have the power to determine whether a state's invoca-
tion of Article 15 was justified.245 It is unclear whether the Commission
238. Id. % 189.
239. Id.




243. See supra note 134.
244. Baker Report, supra note 3, 1 230, 264, 340.
245. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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and Court also have the power to determine whether a state's withdrawal
of derogation under Article 15 is justified. As a result, a future litigant
before the Commission who was arrested under the offending special
powers could now argue that such arrest violated Article 5 because Brit-
ain has disavailed itself of the Article 15 defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Northern Ireland's Republican and Loyalist communities are
sharply divided by social, cultural, economic, and political differences.
Certain members of those communities felt compelled to adopt unlawful
or violent tactics in support of their political goals. Members of
paramilitary organizations such as the IRA, who claim political motiva-
tion for their crimes, however, derive no special status as prisoners under
existing United Kingdom and international law.
The international community should recognize, however, that those
imprisoned through special powers in derogation from or in violation of
international human rights guarantees are special prisoners, regardless of
the individual's motivation. Security forces in Northern Ireland have en-
joyed "emergency" police powers for over sixty years, powers which
flaunt guarantees set forth in the European Convention on Human
Rights and Britain's own common-law safeguards for the criminal sus-
pect. To call IRA prisoners "ordinary" criminals masks the fact that
Britain operates a split judicial system in Northern Ireland. Those sub-
ject to the special system should be special prisoners.
Britain's experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland contains
two lessons for other western democracies. First, denial of special status
for IRA prisoners was one aspect of a larger campaign to recast the con-
flict in Northern Ireland in security and not political terms. Other na-
tions should be wary of adopting a legal response to terrorism which
emphasizes bringing terrorists to justice at any expense, without address-
ing the fundamentally political problems which allow terrorism to flour-
ish. Second, Britain has tried to strike a legal balance between security
and liberty in Northern Ireland in the battle against terrorism, which
arguably tips too far in favor of the former. Other democracies should
not strike a similarily skewed balance at the expense of cherished human
rights guarantees.
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